This vision of the competence of international courts and tribunals implicitly raises a fundamental principle of law governing the activity of international courts and tribunals, that is, the principle of competence de la competence. This principle to which Michael Reisman dedicated attention has not attracted much consideration in recent times, despite its importance at a time of ever greater proliferation of courts and tribunals.
The present contribution will first try to sketch the contours of the principle of competence de la competence. It will then proceed to an assessment of its effects before contextualizing the said principle as an "ordering principle" in the context of the proliferation of international courts and tribunals.
I. The Contours of the Principle of Competence de la Competence
Outlining the principle of competence de la competence requires grasping its meaning, its applicability, as well as its scope.
A. Grasping Its Meaning
The consensual nature (or basis) of international adjudication 3 has often overshadowed the autonomy of the international judicial function. However, even if consent of the parties lays at the basis of the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, it is in fact consent "as found and determined by" 4 international courts and tribunals that really matters. This implies a fundamental prerequisite of the autonomy of the international judicial function: la competence de la competence.
The principle of competence de la competence refers to the power of an international court or tribunal to define the limits of its own jurisdiction. Competence de la competence is the process through which an international court or tribunal "regards its jurisdiction as established" 5 or not established. It relates to the competence of an . A voluntary system of jurisprudence in origin as well as in jurisdiction, it agrees with the just demands of sovereignty, of which it is only an enlightened exercise. For, if there is no power superior to the States which can force a judge upon them, there is nothing to oppose their selection of an arbitrator by common agreement to settle their disputes, thus preferring a less imperfect means of securing justice to a method more problematical and more burdensome. The principle of competence de la competence is intrinsically linked to the international adjudication phenomenon. It arose in the field of international arbitration in relation to the first commissions established under Articles VI and VII of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain signed on NoveJ!1-ber 19, 1794 (Jay Treaty). The first case in which the principle was proclaimed is the Betsey Case. There, the two American commissioners filed separate opinions defending the right of the commissioners to determine their own jurisdiction. 10 It was held that the commissioners umust necessarily decide upon cases being within or without their competency:'n The principle of competence de la competence was reaffirmed in the Sally Case, but through an arrangement between the commissioners and not through a judiciary pronouncement.
12 Some other cases like the lsaac Harrington Case before the United States and Costa Rican Commission emphasized the importance of this principle. 13 However, as pointed out by Shihata, ~~[u] p to that time there was not one judicial decision that enunciated clearly the principle that arbitral tribunals have the power to determine their jurisdiction:' 14 In this context, the Alabama Arbitration constitutes a turning point. The arbitrators made a declaration according to which the indirect claims do not constitute upon the principles of international law applicable to such cases good foundation for an award of compensation or computation of damages between nations, and 1030 
l VII Making
Applying Law by Tribunals should upon such principles be wholly excluded from the consideration of the tribunal in making its award, even if there were no disagreement between the two governments as to the competency of the tribunal to decide there on.
For this reason, the Alabama Arbitration is considered by many as having paved the way for the power of arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction. 16 Here again, Shihata has been rather critical of the importance given to the Alabama Arbitration as a precedent in this area, stressing the need for more moderation with regard to its value:
The Alabama Arbitration did not, therefore, create a clear-cut rule as to the competence de la competence. It emphasized, however, an important fact-the competence de la competence is a useful device which insures that adjudication will continue even when the parties disagree in the course of the proceedings .... The assent of the parties was needed to allow the tribunal the power to determine the issue and was necessary to give its declaration a binding character. 17 The principle of competence de la competence was then codified in multilateral treaties, and in particular in Article 48 18 Competence de la competence also benefited from a crystallization process in many arbitral proceedings subsequent to the Alabama case. Noteworthy are the Flutie Cases in which it was stated:
This Commission has no jurisdiction over any claims other than those owned by citizens of the United States of America. The American citizenship of a claimant must be satisfactorily established as primary requisite to the examination and decision of his claim. The award of the arbitrator in the Walfish Bay Boundary case is also noteworthy:
[I]t is a constant doctrine of public international law that the arbitrator has powers to settle questions as to his own competence by interpreting the range of the agreement, submitting to his decision the question in dispute. 20 The award marks the fact that following the uncertainties which surrounded the principle of competence de la competence since its early conceptualization at the end of the eighteenth century and during the major part of the nineteenth century, practice in the course of the twentieth century acknowledged the said principle as a "constant doctrine of public internationallaw:' 21 There is strong recognition of its importance in the Rio Grande Irrigation and Land Company case of 1923. 22 Perceived as a "constant doctrine of public internationallaw;' 23 competence de la competence was progressively understood as an inherent power of each international tribunal. The principle of competence de la competence was thus conferred a specific and explicit status in international arbitration. As such, international arbitration sowed the seeds for a development and recognition of the principle in the entire system of international adjudication. The attitude of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), one of the first ever permanent international jurisdictions, towards competence de la competence is a good illustration of that point. It is noteworthy that the PCIJ Statute expressly provided that u[i]n the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Courf' 24 Dealing with the competence of a mixed commission in (1923) C'Whatever be the proper construction of the instruments controlling the Tribunal or of the rules of procedure, there is inherent in this and every legal Tribunal a power, and indeed a duty, to entertain, and, in proper cases, to raise for themselves, preliminary points going to their jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Such a power is inseparable from and indispensable to the proper conduct of business. This principle has been laid down and approved as applicable to international arbitral tribunals:' (internal citation omitted)). 
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Albeit prompt in affirming expressis verbis the principle of competence de la competence with respect to other international jurisdictions, the PCIJ was less bold with respect to its own jurisdiction. 26 As an illustration, one can mention the Peter Pdzmdny University case in which the PCIJ examined its competence de la competence without affirming with a clear wording that it was engaging de jure in such a process. The relevant passage of the judgment of the PCIJ reads as follows:
The Court will examine in the first place whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. 27 The Court's position, in regard to jurisdiction, cannot be compared to the position of municipal courts, amongst which jurisdiction is apportioned by the State, either ratione materiae or in accordance with a hierarchical system. This division of jurisdiction is, generally speaking, binding upon the Parties and implies an obligation on the part of the Courts ex officio to ensure its observance.
Id. This dictum implies that the Court considered itself as not being bound by such a doctrine.
27 Here, the PCIJ is dealing more with the "derived" facet of competence de la competence (jurisdiction to entertain) than with its "primary" facet which is the power of the Court to determine if it is competent to act at all. This last aspect should be examined in the first place and not the ~~jurisdiction to entertain the suit" as the PCIJ did. On these points, see infra. The fact that a defence on the merits is cast in a particular form, cannot affect the competence of the tribunal or other organ concerned,-otherwise parties would be in a position themselves to control that competence, which would be inadmissible. As has already been seen in the case of the competence of the Court, so with that of the Council, its competence must depend on the character of the dispute submitted to it and on the issues thus raisednot on those defences on the merits, or other considerations, which would become relevant only after the jurisdictional issues had been settled. 39 In light of the use of such elements common to the ICJ as well as international arbitration, it can easily be asserted that the principle of competence de la competence is a principle of law which belongs to the "general principles of procedurallaw"
4 o govern- ing international courts and tribunals. 41 It is part of the it accepted canons governing matters pertaining to jurisdiction:' 42 Nonetheless, one can ask whether the scope of the principle of competence de la competence is subject to the judicial, the arbitral or the quasi-judicial nature of an international court or tribunal.
B. Grasping Its Applicability
In its judgment in the Nottebohm Case, the Court, referring to the principle of competence de la competence pointed out that [ t] his principle, which is accepted by general international law in the matter of arbitration, assumes particular force when the international tribunal is no longer an arbitral tribunal constituted by virtue of a special agreement between the parties for the purpose of adjudicating on a particular dispute, but is an institution which has been pre-established by an international instrument defining its jurisdiction and regulating its operation, and is, in the present case, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 43 The reasoning of the Court draws a delineation between international permanent jurisdictions like the ICJ and arbitral tribunals when appraising competence de la competence. According to the Court, competence de la competence uassumes particular force" 44 in the case of an institution which has been upre-established by an international instrument defining its jurisdiction and regulating its operation:' 45 How and why such a delineation between permanent jurisdictions and arbitral tribunals was ascertained by the ICJ, remains enigmatic and abstract. First of all, the Court itself does not really derive its competence de la competence from its Statute, but rather from a principle of general international law which has its foundations in international arbitration. This is not open to question. The Court has recognized in the Nottebohm Case that its competence de la competence transcends the ordinary meaning of Article 36, paragraph 6 of the Statute of the ICJ:
Article 36, paragraph 6, suffices to invest the Court with power to adjudicate on its jurisdic~ tion in the present case. But even if this were not the case, the Court, uwhose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it" (Article Neither the Statute of the ICJ nor the Rules of Court give a "particular force"47 to competence de la competence. Competence de la competence as a principle uwhich is accepted by general internationallaw" 48 is enshrined in international adjudication practice. Its applicability is not linked to the adjudicatory or the arbitral nature of the international body in charge of dispute settlement. The Court seems to have admitted this reality in the Legality of the Use of Force case whereby it endorsed the arguments of the parties according to which competence de la competence is 11 reflected"49 in Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute rather than being "based on" or "conferred by"so that provision.
Even international dispute settlement bodies like World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and the WTO Appellate Body which cannot be qualified as being arbitral tribunals or purely international permanent jurisdictions like the ICJ or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), had recourse to competence de la competence within the WTO dispute settlement system as a ~~widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative, and to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes before it:'sl Taking advantage of the silence of the DSU with regard to the nature of the panel function, the Appellate Body has gone even further and declared that "WTO panels have certain powers that are inherent in their adjudicative function. Notably, panels have the right to determine whether they have jurisdiction in a given case, as well as to determine the scope of their jurisdiction:'s 2 One peculiar example is the application of the principle of competence de la competence in the framework of Article 25 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). This provision provides for arbitration as "an alternative means of dispute settlement [to] shall be subject to mutual agreement of the parties which shall agree on the procedures to be followed and that ~~the parties to the proceeding shall agree to abide by the arbitration award:' 5 4 Most of the main ingredients of arbitration are thus referred to in Article 25 of the DSU. In the first and only case submitted to arbitration under Article 25, United States-Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act, and in spite of the agreement of the parties on the issues to be dealt with by the Arbitral Tribunal, the latter decided to raise ex officio the issue of the competence de la competence. It was an unequivocal sign of the will of the tribunal to fully exercise inherent judicial powers:
The Arbitrators note that this is the first time since the establishment of the WTO that Members have had recourse to arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU. Whereas the DSB establishes panels or refers matters to other arbitration bodies, Article 25 provides for a different procedure. The parties to this dispute only had to notify the DSB of their recourse to arbitration. No decision is required from the DSB for a matter to be referred to arbitration under Article 25. In the absence of a multilateral control over recourse to that provision, it is incumbent on the Arbitrators themselves to ensure that it is applied in accordance with the rules and principles governing the WTO system. As recalled by the Appellate Body in United States-Anti-Dumping Act of1916, it is a widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative. The Arbitrators believe that this principle applies also to arbitration bodies. In case there be any question as to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrators to deal with this dispute, we provide brief reasons for our conclusion that we do have the necessary jurisdiction. 5
5
Even in instances where the agreement of the parties is reached ex post facto with regard to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, the latter can still decide to determine its competence de la competence. The award in Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe demonstrates such a high degree of due diligence exercised by some arbitral tribunals with regard to their competence de la competence. In that case, Zimbabwe first objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal but then withdrew its objection. Nevertheless, for the arbitral tribunal presided over by a former president of the IC] (Judge Gilbert Guillaume), competence de la competence had still to be assessed:
In light of the importance of jurisdiction as a foundation for arbitral decisions and the special competence granted to arbitral tribunals to determine their jurisdiction, the Tribunal considers it important to address, albeit briefly, the question of jurisdiction despite the current agreement between the parties. It is the Tribunal's judgment that jurisdiction under IN Id. at 28.
---all jurisdiction con1petence finds application in judicial or quasi-judicial conception this primary question is answered in the affirmative, the tribunal becomes the judge of its own competence:' 62 The chronological approach suggested by Shihata with regard to the exercise of competence de la competence does not reflect the practice of many international courts and tribunals. First of all, taking into account the practice of the ICJ, it is now well-established that the ltpower to determine the nature of the controversy" 63 (and even the existence as such of the controversy) lies within the competence de la competence of the ICJ and is not a matter to be controlled ab initio by the parties to the dispute. 64 Then, conceiving a sort of chronological hierarchy between the two-mentioned stages may induce a "chicken or egg dilemma:' An international court or tribunal in exercising its competence de la competence may also decide to look first at the title of jurisdiction, that is, may exercise first what Shihata called its power ltto determine, through the interpretation of the jurisdictional instruments, whether jurisdiction was accepted by the parties:' 65 Shihata himself recognized that such a hierarchy could be moot when he pointed out that an international court or tribunal exercising its competence de la competence uwill do so primarily by interpreting the jurisdictional instrument to reach a conclusion on whether the parties have consented to adjudicate before it the dispute at hand. " 
VII Making and Applying Law by International Tribunals
No doubt there is a duty in an international tribunal to hear and determine the cases it is both seised of, and competent to go into; and therefore, equally to consider the question of its competence. But there must be limits to this duty.
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The fact that jurisdiction is assumed, does not of course mean that the tribunal concerned necessarily proceeds to hear and determine the n1erits, for it may reject the claim in limine on some ground of inadmissibility (non-exhaustion of local remedies, undue delay, operation of a time-limit, etc.). Such a rejection however, on grounds of this kind, is itself an exercise ofjurisdiction. 68 The line between questions of jurisdiction (which basically relate to the competence of the Court to act at all) and questions of admissibility, receivability or examinability (which relate to the nature of the claim, or to particular circumstances connected with it) is apt in certain cases to get blurred .... [T] here have certainly been cases in which a claim has been pronounced to be inadmissible, even though the objections on the score of jurisdiction had not been fully disposed of, so that strictly the court might not be competent to act at all. Per contra, there have been cases in which a court has found itself to be competent, yet has refused to proceed any further, on what v.rere essentially grounds of propriety.
69
What can be deduced from this quotation is that the principle of competence de la competence operates in two ways. Prima, competence de la competence consists in the power of an international court or tribunal to decide on its "competence to act at all" (we refer to it as ajurisdiction over jurisdiction"). Secunda, competence de la co1npetence allows an international court or tribunal to decide on the "admissibility" of a claim (we refer to it as ({jurisdiction over admissibility"). Those two facets of the function of the principle of competence de la competencec constitute the core of the power of international courts and tribunals to determine the limits of their own jurisdiction. Refusing to engage in a debate "whether 'competence' and 'jurisdiction: incompetence and fin de non-recevoir should invariably and in every connection be regarded as synonymous expressions;' 7 o the PCIJ in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case stated that the preliminary question to be decided is not merely whether the nature and subject of the dispute laid before the Court are such that the Court derives from them jurisdiction to entertain it, but also whether the conditions upon which the exercise of this jurisdiction is dependent [conditions of admissibility] are all fulfilled in the present case. 
so Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The Principle of Competence de la Competence in International Adjudication
The two elements of "jurisdiction over jurisdiction" and "jurisdiction over admissibility" are here well defined. This being said, it is important to stress that from a chronological point of view, "jurisdiction over jurisdiction" is by principle the first step in the exercise of competence de la competence; 73 then follows tljurisdiction over admissibilitY:' This dynamic has been confirmed by the case-law of the ICJ. 74 The scope of application of competence de la competence is not limited to the aspects described above. A third element is also foreseen in the case-law of some international courts· and tribunals: ajurisdiction to entertain the merits of a case:' In other words, the principle of competence de la competence vests international courts and tribunals with the power to determine not only if they have competence to act, but also competence to entertain the merits of a case. This pronouncement is of great importance for two main reasons. First, it shows that the determination of the jurisdiction to entertain the merits may be linked to the exercise of the competence de la competence. But, most of all it underlines that competence de la competence ad definitionem has as a consequence the determination by an international court or tribunal of its ucompetence to act" or to quote from the judgment of the Court the ability of an international court or tribunal to "assume[] jurisdiction:' 76 This is the primary function of the principle of competence de la competence. "Jurisdiction over admissibility" and "jurisdiction to entertain the merits" are only components of the derived function of the principle of competence de la competence.77 The derived function is what Shihata refers to as the subject matter of the power or the ~~process of the Court's determination of its substantive jurisdiction:' 78 The dynamic primary I derived function of competence de la competence is palpable in the award rendered by an arbitral tribunal in the Case Concerning the Reevaluation of the German Mark. The arbitral tribunal depicted the said dynamic in the following terms: 77 This is where one could disagree with Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice who seemed to place (/jurisdiction over jurisdiction" and "jurisdiction over admissibility" on the same level, that is, both are components of the primary function of competence de la competence. Indeed, Fitzmaurice said that "jurisdiction over admissibility" "is itself an exercise ofjurisdiction." Northern Cameroons, 1963 I.C.J. at 101 n.2 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice) (emphasis added).
78 SHIHATA, supra note 4, at 83. Shihata went further by explaining that [p ]ut in its simplest form the subject matter of the Court's power to determine its jurisdiction, is this jurisdiction itself. To differentiate it from the power (which is a jurisdiction of a more preliminary character), this subject matter will always be referred to as the Court's "substantive jurisdiction:' ... On so doing the Court has not always been a mere executor of the will of the parties. It considered, however, such will as the major foundation of its substantive jurisdiction, and, relying on it and on its constituent instrument, built for this jurisdiction a complicated structure that was made possible and became more refined by the continued exercise of the very competence de la competence.
Id. at 83. The last sentence of the above quoted excerpt says it all. To be or not to be useised of jurisdiction;'so there lies the primary facet of competence de la competence. The exercise by the arbitral tribunal of its upower to decide questions as to its jurisdiction'' or the determination of "its authority to act" is mutatis mutandis an exercise of its competence de la competence. The subsequent determination of the "jurisdiction over admissibility" or/and the jurisdiction to entertain the merits is a step which is generally subject to the prior determination of the "competence to act at all:' The award in the Case Concerning the Reevaluation of the German Mark is unambiguous on that point:
The Arbitral Tribunal, in its considered judgment, concludes that it not only has jurisdiction in the dispute before it but that it can and, in the circumstances of this case, must exercise that jurisdiction and deal with the representations made by the Applicants on their merits . ... We conclude that the exercise of its jurisdiction in the matter before the Tribunal and the adjudication on the merits on the Applicants' representations are not inconsistent with the Tribunal's judicial junctions.
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The scope of application of the principle of competence de la competence has revealed its various facets. It is now interesting to look at its modus operandi in the context of the multiplication of international courts and tribunals. Indeed, the latter has fostered substantial differentiation in the modus operandi of competence de la competence.
Assessing the Effects of Competence de la Competence
The assessment of the effects of competence de la competence has been, and is still, the subject of much discussion. have sometimes been reluctant to decisively affirm their competence de la competence, others have opted for a broad appreciation of the effect of their competence de la competence. It suffices here to think about the rather proactive exercise by the Arbitrator ofhis competence de la competence in the Ottoman Public Debt arbitration. 84 Hence, reviewing the arbitral practice, some authors considered that u[i]t is questionable ... whether the International Court of Justice has power to raise, of its own accord, a question concerning its jurisdiction, where it is not disputed by the parties:'ss It is not within the purposes of the present contribution to discuss in detail the controversies surrounding the effects of the principle of competence de la competence. Since the Alabama Arbitration, it is undisputable that competence de la competence has developed and has acquired some specific characteristics depending on the activity and the nature of the various international courts and tribunals. Nowadays, it is permissible to make a distinction between three types of effects that may derive from the exercise of competence de la competence by international courts and tribunals. Only the practice of a few international courts and tribunals will be analyzed hereinafter. to the exercise of the judicial function. Once consent has been given to the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal, the "extensive" effect of competence de la competence presupposes that the said court or tribunal has a quasi-unlimited power to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction. 88 No specific or absolute express limitation on the exercise of competence de la competence is normally provided for in the statutes regulating the activity of these international courts and tribunals. Only the "inherent limitations"
89 of the judicial function may operate to limit the exercise of competence de la competence.
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The main expression of the "extensive" effect of competence de la competence is the one found in Article 36, paragraph 6 of the Statute of the ICJ, which reads as follows: "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court." 91 The ICJ has long developed a practice consisting of attributing a positive effect to its competence de la competence both in contentious 86 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Preliminary Objection, 1953 I.C.J. 111, 119 (Nov. 18) ("Since the Alabama case, it has been generally recognized, following the earlier precedents, that, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, an international tribunal has the right to decide as. to its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret for this purpose the instruments which govern that jurisdiction:' (emphasis added)).
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The Rapporteur of the Convention of 1899 had emphasized the necessity of the principle of competence de la competence, presented by him as being ~~of the very essence of the arbitral function and one of the inherent requirements for the exercise of this function:' PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 18, at 71 (emphasis added). Nowhere is any provision to be found forbidding the Court, "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations': to exercise in regard to Article 4 of the Charter, a multilateral treaty, an interpretative function which falls within the normal exercise of its judicial powers. Accordingly, the Court holds that it is competent ... and considers that there are no reasons why it should decline to answer the question put to it.
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One can also think about the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council case in which the Court recognized its power to determine proprio motu its own jurisdiction,9 3 that is, even if no objection to its jurisdiction is raised by the parties to a dispute and even if such a power does not derive from the text of Article 36, paragraph 6 of the Statute. It is certainly to be desired that objections to the jurisdiction of the Court should be put forward as preliminary objections for separate decision in advance of the proceedings on the merits. The Court must however always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction, and must if necessary go into that matter proprio motu. The real issue raised by the present case was whether, in the event of a party's failure to put forward a jurisdictional objection as a preliminary one, that party might not thereby be held to have acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the· Court. However, since the Court considers its jurisdiction to be established irrespective of any consent of Pakistan's on that basis, it will now proceed to consider Pakistan's objections.
Id. (emphasis added). See also, for situations of non-appearance before the ICJ, the following statement of the Court in the Fisheries jurisdiction case: It is to be regretted that the Government of Iceland has failed to appear in order to plead the objections to the Court's jurisdiction which it is understood to entertain. These approaches of the {(extensive" effect of competence de la competence are in contradiction with the position sustained by some scholars. 95 Moreover, the ICJ itself has in few cases departed from that approach consisting in the conferral of an "extensive" effect to the principle of competence de la competence. The example which comes directly to mind is the one relating to the Norwegian Loans case in which the Court refused to examine the validity of the I( automatic reservation" (domestic jurisdiction reservation) contained in the French declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of the following reasoning:
[T]he Court has before it a provision which both parties to the dispute regard as constituting an expression of their common will relating to the competence of the Court.
The Court does not therefore consider that it is called upon to enter into an examination of the reservation in the light of considerations which are not presented by the issues in the proceedings.
The Court, without prejudging the question, gives effect to the reservation as it stands and as the parties recognize it. 96
That attitude was severely and lengthily criticized by Judge Lauterpacht in his Separate Opinion joined to the judgment in that case. He asserted:
[I]t is my view that it was not open to the Court to act on that particular reservation. This is so for the reason that I consider it legally impossible for the Court to act in disregard of its Statute which imposes upon it the duty and confers upon it the right to determine its jurisdiction. That right cannot be exercised by a party to the dispute. The Court cannot, in any circumstances, treat as admissible the claim that the parties have accepted its jurisdiction subject to the condition that they, and not the Court, will decide on its jurisdiction. To do so is in my view contrary to Article 36( 6) of the Statute which, without any qualification, 97 confers upon the Court the right and imposes upon it the duty to determine its jurisdiction.98
More recently, the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case has vividly illustrated the "extensive" effect of the cor11petence de la competence of the ICJ, excluding any possibility for the parties to a dispute to challenge a determination by 95 (pt. 9), 69 BRIT. Y.B. lNT'L L. 1, 6 (1999) CWhen jurisdiction is referred to, it must always be asked, 'jurisdiction to do what?: Jurisdiction or competence is not, in the sense in which those terms are used in relation to a dispute, a general property vested in the court or tribunal contemplated: it is the power, conferred by the consent of the parties, to make a determination on specified disputed issues which will be binding on the parties because that is what they have consented to:').
See, e.g., Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of justice
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Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 LC.J. 9, 27 (July 6) (emphasis added). 97 The use of the expression "without qualification" by Lauterpacht is another way of describing what we refer to as the "positive" effect of competence de la competence. The ICJ went even further in defending its ~ompetence de la competence following the contention of the respondent party according to which reliance on the res judicata principle uwould justify the Court's ultra vires exercise of its judicial functions contrary to the mandatory requirements of the Statute:'wo The Court replied sharply by stating:
However, the operation of the umandatory requirements of the Statute" falls to be determined by the Court in each case before it; and once the Court has determined, with the force of res judicata, that it has jurisdiction, then for the purposes of that case no question of ultra vires action can arise, the Court having sole competence to determine such matters under the Statute.
101
The counterpart for such "extensive" effect of competence de la competence is the recognition by the ICJ of the principle according to which the Court has to assess its competence de la competence even if the parties have not raised the issue. This progressive development demonstrates that the Hextensive" effect of competence de la competence also implies that international courts and tribunals may be bound to exercise their power to determine their own jurisdiction irrespective of any consent to the parties to a dispute. The following statement of the ICJ in the Legality of the Use of Force cases is a clear indication of such trend:
[I]t is the view of the Court that a distinction has to be made between a question of jurisdiction that relates to the consent of a party and the question of the right of a party to appear before the Court under the requirements of the Statute, which is not a matter of consent. The question is whether as a matter of law Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to seise the Court as a party to the Statute at the time when it instituted proceedings in these cases. Since that question is independent of the views or wishes of the Parties, even if they were now to have arrived at a shared view on the point, the Court would not have to accept that view as necessarily the correct one. Under this provision, the determination by an ICSID tribunal of the extent of its own jurisdiction will be governed by some pre-established criteria like the existence of a legal dispute "arising directly out of an investment:'w 9 Henceforth, there is no conception of a "general unlimited jurisdiction to decide on its own jurisdiction"no when facing for instance clauses such as Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. This is what distinguishes the "extensive" effect of competence de la competence from its ~~restrictive" effect. As explained by Schreuer, it must be remembered that not all of the Convention's jurisdictionalrequirements are subject to the parties' disposition. The Convention also contains objective requirements. Thus, the existence of a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment is an objective fact which must be ascertained independently of the parties' consent .... Therefore, the tribunal may rely on a party's failure to protest the non-existence of its consent. But it cannot rely on the parties when it comes to the Convention's objective requirements.
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The ratio operandi of Article 41 of the ICSID Convention has been further developed by an I CSID tribunal in the Phoenix case. According to the tribunal: In other words, in order for the Centre to have jurisdiction over a dispute, three-wellknown-conditions must be met, according to Article 25, to which one must add a condition resulting from a general principle of law, which is the principle of non retroactivity: first, a condition ratione personae: the dispute must oppose a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State; second, a condition ratione materiae: the dispute must
The tlrestrictive" effect of competence de la competence in the ICSID system is as such that if facts on which the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal rests are contested between the parties, the said tribunal has to decide on those facts. In other words, an ICSID tribunal cannot limit itself to accepting the facts as alleged by a claimant party. The tribunal must take into account the facts and their interpretation as alleged by the claimant, as well as the facts and their interpretation as alleged by the respondent, and take a decision on their existence and proper interpretation.
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The arbitral tribunal in the Phoenix case strengthened that assertion by concluding that the Tribunal considers that as a general approach, it is correct that factual matters should provisionally be accepted at face value, since the proper time to prove or disprove such facts is during the merits phase. But when a particular circumstance constitutes a critical element for the establishment of the jurisdiction itself, such fact must be proven, and the Tribunal must take a decision thereon when ruling on its jurisdiction. In our case, this means that the Tribunal must ascertain that the prerequisites for its jurisdiction are fulfilled, and that the facts on which its jurisdiction can be based are proven.
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This is properly where the urestrictive" effect of competence de la competence lies: an international court or tribunal "must ascertain that the prerequisites for its jurisdiction are fulfilled:'ns Those prerequisites usually take the form of ~~inherent limitations" in the context of the "extensive" effect of competence de la competence. They take the form of "explicit limitations" in the frame of the "restrictive" effect of competence de la competence.
However, it should also be acknowledged that there is no absolute line of demarcation between the extensive effect of competence de la competence and its restrictive effect. Even Article 41 depending on the circumstances of a dispute may integrate a sort of balance between those two effects of competence de la competence. The award rendered in the Tokios case allows us to reach such a conclusion: be a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment; third, a condition ratione voluntatis, i.e. the Contracting State and the investor must consent in writing that the dispute be settled through ICSID arbitration; fourth, a condition ratione temporis: the ICSID Convention must have been applicable at the relevant time. [I] nvestment agreements confirm that state parties are capable of excluding from the scope of the agreement entities of the other party that are controlled by nationals of third countries or by nationals of the host country. The Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, by contrast, includes no such "denial of benefits" provision with respect to entities controlled by third-country nationals or by nationals of the denying party. We regard the absence of such a provision as a deliberate choice of the Contracting Parties. This being said, the "restrictive" effect of competence de la competence has a counterpart. It is a "presumption of exhaustion of competence de la competence." In other words, once competence de la competence has been exercised by an international court or tribunal, the power to determine jurisdiction is considered as being exhausted by the said court or tribunal. This scheme of things is the driving factor in the IC-SID system. As recognized by the very first ICSID Annulment Committee, a decision by which an ICSID arbitral tribunal determined that its own jurisdiction (competence de la competence) can be subject to annulment if and only if the tribunal "manifestly" exceeded its powers. To borrow the words of the Decision on Annulment in the J(lockner v. Cameroon case:
It is neither contestable nor contested that the arbitrators have ((the power to determine their own jurisdiction" (la competence de la competence), subject only to the check of the ad hoc Committee in the case of annulment proceedings provided by the Washington Convention's system. They have exercised this power by interpreting the Protocol of Agreement in itself and with respect to the Management Contract. Even if it is assumed that they thereby exceeded their powers, which remains to be proven, it would, as required by Article 52(1)(b) of the Convention, be necessary that this be "manifest" for the Application to be accepted. to review the decision of a Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal as to its competence with respect to any dispute before it:'ns Finally, the other organ-the Secretary-General-dealing with issues of "jurisdiction" under the ICSID Convention does not benefit from the presumption of exhaustion of competence de la competence. The ICSID arbitral tribunals are the sole beneficiaries of such presumption. Therefore, when the ICSID Secretary-General has found that a dispute is not manifestly outside the ICSID's jurisdiction, 119 such a determination does not preclude an ICSID arbitral tribunal from exercising its competence de la competence. The competence of the Tribunal is obviously derived from that of the Centre .... Nevertheless, this fact does not prevent the Tribunal from examining the competence of ICSID, because, evidently Article 36(3) does not confer upon the Secretary-General of ICSID, responsible for the registration of Request, notably as concerns verification of the competence of the Centre, the task other than a mere obligation of an extremely light control which in the execution does not, in any sense, bind the Tdbunal in any way in the latter's appreciation of its own competence or lack thereof The Tribunal will still have a number of questions to raise and also to find answers thereto.
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In sum, a number of safeguards are attached to the "restrictive" effect of competence de la competence under the ICSID system. This is due in particular to the explicit limitations which govern the competence de la competence of ICSID arbitral tribunals. These tribunals are presumed to fully exercise their competence de la competence in light of the said explicit limitations and thus-in order to enhance the predictability of the system-it is necessary to guarantee that competence de la competence against de novo reviews or screenings by other arbitral tribunals (for example, ICSID annulment committees) or other international courts.
In the context of other dispute settlement mechanisms, competence de la competence is characterized by a "sui generis" effect. "Sui generis" effect combines both inherent limitations and explicit limitations. It entails that an international court or tribunal should-or must in some circumstances-refrain from going "beyond its normative boundaries" 122 in exercising its competence de la competence. The sui generis effect of competence de la competence, although not referred to by statutes and rules governing the functioning of international courts and tribunals, finds a strong reflection in the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement system. The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
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The wording of the DSU does not refer to a normative boundaries" 124 but to ((security and predictability" 125 in the exercise by the panels and/ or the Appellate Body of their competence de la competence in a given dispute. The principle of unot adding to or, not diminishing rights and obligations" is another way of expressing such ((normative  boundaries:' 126 Therefore, in the WTO Dispute Settlement System competence de la competence must be assessed by also keeping in mind the necessity of preserving the balance of rights and obligations negotiated by WTO member states and by the principle of not adding to or diminishing rights and obligations. The sui generis effect of competence de la competence in the DSU is well illustrated in the general statement 122 On that expression, see Reisman, supra note 1, at 57 about WTO rules and the concept of "security and predictability" made by the Appellate Body in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages 11:
WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. WTO rules are not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgments in confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. They will serve the multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that in mind. In that way, we will achieve the (security and predictability" sought for the multilateral trading system by the Members of the WTO through the establishment of the dispute settlement system.
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The sui generis effect of competence de la competence has been even more emphasized in the context of Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU. In the course of the above-mentioned United States-Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act case, the Arbitrators considered that competence de la competence at the WTO should be exercised with a view to ensuring that the object and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is preserved. The following excerpt from their award is illustrative: Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it. In this respect we are referring not only to preambular language but also to positive law provisions in the DSU itself. Therefore, by contrast to the "extensive" and the "restrictive" effects of competence de la competence whereby international courts and tribunals either have a rather extensive interpretation (through the mechanism of inherent limitations) or a more restrictive interpretation (through the mechanism of explicit limitations) of their jurisdiction, the "sui generis" effect of competence de la competence purports to preserve the normative foundations and pillars of a dispute settlement system. Such a situation may lead to extreme "judicial caution" 130 on the part of international courts and tribunals when dealing with their jurisdiction. The United States-Zeroing case gives some illustration of the tendency toward judicial caution in the exercise of competence de la competence. Article 8.7 of the DSU establishes that, whenever there is no agreement between the parties, the ultimate power to determine the composition of the panel rests with the Director-General. In United States-Zeroing, the Panel underscored that there is no provision of the DSU that would give it the authority to make a finding or ruling on the provisions of the DSU regarding panel composition contained in Article 8. 7. The Panel refrained from ruling on the substance of the claim of the European Communities with respect to its composition. On appeal, the European Communities alleged that the Panel acted inconsistently with the "basic requirements of due process and the full exercise of the judicial function by failing to address properly its claim that the Panel was composed in a manner inconsistent with Articles 8.3 and 21.5 of the DSU:' 131 The European Communities submitted that, because panels, and ultimately the Appellate Body, have the authority and the obligation to rule on the correct interpretation of the DSU, defects that could arise during panel composition are subject to judicial review by them. The United States responded that the European Communities' claim on the Panel's composition did not fall within the Panel's jurisdiction and asserted that "an improperly composed panel would not have the authority to make findings on the merits of the European Communities' claims, including on claims related to its own composition:'
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In a rather prudent manner, the WTO Appellate Body declared:
On the substance of the European Communities' appeal, we note that, on 28 November 2007, the Director-General was requested to determine the composition of the compliance panel under Article 8.7 of the DSU. In our view, Article 8. 7 confers on the Director-General The WTO dispute settlement system has allowed the development of new trends with regard to competence de la competence. Since the Alabama case, competence de la competence seemed to be rooted in a sort of ~~natural law" governing international courts and tribunals. By admitting that competence de la competence may be subject to new legal dimensions or new legal expressions, many dispute settlement mechanisms-which do not appear prima facie as traditional international courts and tribunals 134 -might be able to give new contours to the principle of competence de la competence in disputes brought under their statutes and their rules of procedure.135 The contours and effects of the principle of competence de la competence thus benefit from the multiplication of international courts and tribunals. Then, remains the question of knowing whether competence de la competence and the phenomenon of proliferation of dispute settlement procedures are tied by a sort of "reciprocal" relationship. The principle of competence de la competence has clearly evolved and will continue to evolve in this era of multiplication of courts and tribunals. However, the effect as well as the action of competence de la competence in the rationalization of such a phenomenon-that is, the action of competence de la competence as an uordering principle" -still need to be evaluated.
Ill. Contextualizing Competence de la Competence in an Era of Proliferation of Courts and Tribunals: An Ordering Principle?
In dealing with principles and rules capable of avoiding jurisdictional overlaps or conflicts between various international courts and tribunals, the principle of competence de la competence has not garnered much attention. Yuval Shany has, however, in his Id.
the fact that the ABC was not an adjudicatory body strictu sensu does not mean that it lacked Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Moreover, a number of features of the ABC proceedings suggest that the ABC was intentionally endowed with the authority to interpret the provisions of its constitutive instruments, which define the scope of its own competence. but did not go so far as to refer directly to the principle of competence de la competence as a competition-regulating principle in international adjudication. Addressing the principle of comity, Shany explains that a court or tribunal exercising discretionary jurisdiction ... might be justified in deciding to defer jurisdiction in favour of another judicial body, which is better situated to address the particular dispute at hand and to take into consideration the various rights and interests of the parties before it. 137 Such an interpretation of comity shows that it may play in some circumstances the same function as the principle of the competence de la competence. In that sense, it appears better to refer to competence de la competence as a means of avoiding jurisdictional conflicts since it is enshrined in the lex lata, while comity, for the time being, is soft, to say the least, in its legal facets. Shany himself admits that "while a rule of comity is certainly desirable it is far from clear whether such rule can be regarded as part of existing internationallaw:' 139 This being said, considering the principle of competence de la competence as an ordering principle in a context of multiplication of international courts and tribunals might raise a number of legal problems. In particular, the ustakes are high" when From this quotation, one may doubt whether the power or the discretion of a WTO panel extends to freely deciding to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction even if a panel has an inherent power to establish whether it has jurisdiction and whether a particular matter is within its jurisdiction. 141 The position of the Panel itself in Mexico-Soft Drinks was to consider that it had ~~no discretion to decide whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction in a case properly before it:' 142 Referring to Article 11 of the DSU and to the ruling of the Appellate Body in Australia-Salmon, 143 the Panel observed that ~~the aim of the WTO dispute settlement system is to resolve the matter at issue in particular cases and to secure a positive solution to disputes" 144 and that a panel is required ~~to address the claims on which a finding is necessary to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations or rulings to the parties:' 145 From this, the Panel concluded that a WTO panel uwould seem therefore not to be in a position to choose freely whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction:' 146 On appeal, Mexjco contended that the Panel erred in rejecting Mexico's request that it decline to exercise jurisdiction. Mexico submitted that WTO panels uhave certain implied jurisdictional powers that derive from their nature as adjudicative bodies:' 147 According to Mexico,
[s ]uch powers include the power to refrain from exercising substantive jurisdiction in circumstances where the underlying or predominant elements of a dispute derive from rules of international law under which claims cannot be judicially enforced in the WTO, such as the NAFTA provisions or when one of the disputing parties refuses to take the matter to the appropriate forum.
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The Appellate Body decided not to follow Mexico's assertions and rather declared:
Notably, panels have the right to determine whether they have jurisdiction in a given case, as well as to determine the scope of their jurisdiction. In this regard, the Appellate Body has previously stated that it is a widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative, and to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes before it . Although it upheld the finding of the Panel, the Appellate Body was careful to make a precision which is of importance for the exercise of competence de la competence by WTO panels, noting that it had expressed no view as to whether there may be other circumstances in which legal impediments could exist that would preclude a panel from ruling on the merits of the claims that are before it. In the present case, Mexico argues that the United States' claims under Article Ill of the GATT 1994 are inextricably linked to a broader dispute, and that only a NAFTA panel could resolve the dispute as a whole. Nevertheless, Mexico does not take issue with the Panel's finding that llneither the subject matter nor the respective positions of the parties are identical in the dispute under the NAFTA ... and the dispute before us:' Mexico also stated that it could not identify a legal basis that would allow it to raise, in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding, the market access claims it is pursuing under the NAFTA. It is furthermore undisputed that no t-JAFTA panel as yet has decided the tlbroader dispute" to which Mexico has alluded. Finally, we note that Mexico has expressly stated that the socalled llexclusion clause" of Article 2005.6 of the NAFTA had not been llexercised': We do not express any view on whether a legal impediment to the exercise of a panel's jurisdiction would exist in the event that features such as those mentioned above were present. In any event, we see no legal impediments applicable in this case.
150
The Appellate Body makes it clear here that in some circumstances, a panel may, in the exercise of its competence de la competence, decline to "act at all" if another dispute settlement mechanism is more suitable to entertain its jurisdiction. None- 148 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 149 Id.~~ 45-46 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 150 Id. ~ 54 (emphasis added) (ellipsis in original) (internal citations omitted). Conferring on the principle of competence de la competence the function of an ordering principle in the galaxy of international courts and tribunals so as to avoid overlaps and conflicts of jurisdiction does not mean in any sense that competence de la competence precludes a court or tribunal from exercising its supervisory powers over another court when it is given such mandate by its statute. This was clearly recognized by the ICJ in the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council case. One of the parties to the dispute pleaded that the principle of the competence de la competence made the ICAO Council's jurisdictional decisions conclusive and unappealable~1 53 The ICJ replied to that contention in a strong passage, saying:
Not only do issues of jurisdiction involve questions of law, but these questions may well be asjmportant and co111plicated as any that arise on the merits,-sometimes more so. They And the Court added:
Clearly, not only do obvious reasons of convenience call for such exercise as early as possible-in the present case, here and now-but also substantial considerations of principle do so,-for it would be contrary to accepted standards of the good administration of justice to allow an international organ to examine and discuss the merits of a dispute when its competence to do so was not only undetermined but actively challenged. Yet this is precisely what the Court would be allowing if it now held itself not to have jurisdiction to deal with the matter because it could only hear appeals from final decisions of the Council on the merits.
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At a time of proliferation of international courts and tribunals, with risks of contradictory judgments as well as risks of forum shopping and of parallel litigation, it appears important to think of legal ways to overcome these risks. The range of practices in terms of forum selection provisions running from exclusivity to non-exclusivity, and the scarcity of jurisdiction-regulating norms addressing multiple proceedings, such as the lis alibi pendens, electa una via or res judicata provisions, do not lead one to conclude that there are clear and common jurisdictional-regulating rules. 156 As advocated by Yuval Shany:
[I]n the future, given the need to strengthen the coherence of the international legal system, new methods ought to be explored in order to unify further the international judiciary and to alleviate procedural problems associated with jurisdictional overlaps, inter alia, by introducing additional jurisdiction-regulating rules capable of providing greater levels of coordination and harmonization to the relations between the various international courts and tribunals.
how and when the principle of competence de la competence will be consecrated by international courts and tribunals as competition-regulating principle.
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore that if the principle of competence de la competence has not yet effectively rationalized the proliferation of courts and tribunals, the said proliferation has without any doubt influenced the development of the contours and effects of the principle of competence de la competence in the system of international adjudication. It is not only the law which benefits from. different perceptions in the context of the multiplication of international court and tribunals; the fundamental principles governing the procedural law of international courts and tribunals such as competence de la competence are themselves being rethought through new lenses. Whether these developments are for better or for worse might in the future capture the attention of international lawyers.
